A Forward Authentication Key Management Scheme for Heterogeneous Sensor Networks by Jen-Yan Huang et al.
Hindawi Publishing Corporation
EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking
Volume 2011, Article ID 296704, 10 pages
doi:10.1155/2011/296704
Research Article
A Forward Authentication Key Management Scheme for
Heterogeneous Sensor Networks
Jen-Yan Huang, I-En Liao, and Hao-Wen Tang
Department of Computer Science and Engineering, National Chung Hsing University, Taichung 402, Taiwan
Correspondence should be addressed to I-En Liao, ieliao@nchu.edu.tw
Received 1 June 2010; Revised 13 September 2010; Accepted 23 October 2010
Academic Editor: Damien Sauveron
Copyright © 2011 Jen-Yan Huang et al. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative CommonsAttribution License,
which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
Key encryption technology is a basic technique for protecting the secrecy of transmitted data among sensor nodes in wireless sensor
networks. However, sensor nodes are inherently limited by insuﬃcient hardware resources such as memory capacity and battery
lifetime. As a result, few current key management schemes are appropriate for wireless sensor networks. This paper proposes a new
key management method that uses dynamic key management schemes for heterogeneous sensor networks. The proposed scheme
loads a hash function into the base station, cluster heads, and sensor nodes. The cluster heads and sensor nodes then generate their
own keychains to provide forward authentication in case of key changes, security breaches, key changes due to security breaches.
The cluster heads and sensor nodes establish pairwise keys to ensure transmission secrecy. The proposed scheme decreases the
number of keys required for sensor nodes and cluster heads and is robust to the following attacks: guessing attacks, replay attacks,
man-in-the-middle attacks, node capture attacks, and denial-of-service attacks.
1. Introduction
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) consist of many sensor
nodes capable of wireless communication and data collec-
tion. In addition to sensor nodes, most WSNs include two
other components, which are base station and cluster head.
WSNs are suitable for military applications, environ-
mental monitoring, meteorological data collection, medical
information monitoring, and so on. WSNs solve the wiring
problem that traditional wired networks face.Wireless sensor
nodes have the advantages of small size, easy deployment,
and dynamic configuration.
Sensor nodes are limited by insuﬃcient hardware
resources, such as memory capacity, battery lifetime, and
processor speed. The limitations of memory determine
the amount of data to be stored, while battery lifetime
determines the life of sensor nodes and slow processors
cannot handle complex computations. These problems in
turn will influence the eﬃciency of sensor networks.
Researchers have previously proposed some key man-
agement schemes for homogeneous sensor networks [1]. In
this type of environment, all sensor nodes have the same
characteristics, such as battery lifetime, computation power,
and memory capacity. However, this scheme encounters the
problems of low transmission speed, limited scalability, and
a lack of fault tolerance [1]. Heterogeneous sensor networks
(HSNs) can avoid these problems. In HSNs, which include
several kinds of sensor nodes, diﬀerent kinds of sensor nodes
have diﬀerent properties and transmission ranges.
This study proposes a key management system for a
heterogeneous sensor network. The members of this net-
work include a minority of powerful high-end sensors (H-
sensors), which work as cluster heads, and a majority of low-
end sensors (L-sensors). The high-end sensors have more
memory, a wider transmission range, longer battery and
greater fault tolerance. Low-end sensors represent general
sensor nodes.
Regarding the security issues in the wireless sensor
network, the encrypting scheme must not increase the
load of sensor nodes. If sensor nodes need to perform
complex computations for encryption, it would consume the
energy of sensor nodes. Hence, the traditional encrypting
and decrypting method is not suitable for wireless sensor
networks.
In the proposed method, the L-sensors only store a little
data at a time. Hence, they only require a little memory
2 EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking
to work quickly. H-sensors regularly replace the encrypting
key based on the status of the cluster. At the same time,
the L-sensors can determine if the new key is legal. This
design requires fewer resources to achieve the security of
sensor nodes in wireless sensor networks, while ensuring
confidentiality, integrity, and availability.
Following this introduction, the structure of this paper is
as follows. Section 2 reviews related work. Section 3 describes
the proposed scheme. Section 4 provides the security anal-
ysis. Section 5 presents system analysis. Finally, Section 6
oﬀers conclusions.
2. Related Work
This section discusses related research about the foundation
of security mechanisms and key management schemes for
wireless sensor networks.
2.1. Foundation of Security Mechanism. A typical WSN
transmits data between nodes via radio. To protect the
security of data transmission, a key cryptosystem can ensure
the confidentiality, availability, and integrity of data.
2.1.1. Message Authentication Code. The message authenti-
cation code (MAC) [2] performs message authentication
using the secret key shared by the sender and receiver. The
receiver can verify the validity of messages with the MAC.
The proposed scheme combines the encryption method and
the MAC algorithm, as Figure 1 illustrates.
2.1.2. Hash Function. The proposed scheme is based on the
one-way hash function [3, 4]. A hash value, generated by a
hash function H(X), is given by h = H(X), in which X is
a variable-length message and H(X) is the hash value with
a fixed length. The hash value is appended to the message,
allowing the receiver to authenticate it; the hash function
itself is not a secret. The hash function is the “fingerprint”
of a file, a message, or other block of data.
2.2. Key Management Schemes for Wireless Sensor Networks.
In wireless sensor networks, there are three methods of
assigning keys: random, deterministic, and hybrid [1]. In
the random method, the system randomly chooses several
keys from the key pool and then loads them into sensor
nodes to create the key-chain. The deterministic method uses
dynamic computation to generate keys that can enhance the
connection between sensor nodes. In addition, the system
can update the key periodically through diﬀerent situations.
By updating the key, the system can isolate malicious nodes
and maintain security. The hybrid method combines the
advantages of these two methods.
Eschenauer and Gligor [5] proposed a random key
predistribution scheme that focuses on symmetric encryp-
tion and decryption. To build the initial encrypting and
decrypting key between sensor nodes, the system first
generates a huge key pool. The sensor nodes then randomly
choose several keys from the key pool and load them before
deployment. The sensor nodes use these preloaded keys to
generate pairwise keys, which create safe communication
channels between neighboring nodes. This communication
channel is called a key path, and it allowed sensor nodes to
connect with other nodes in the environment. To protect the
confidentiality of the key path, each key corresponds to only
one index value. However, when an attacker finds the key, the
sensor nodes immediately change the index value to update
the key and select a new pairwise key.
Chan et al. [6] proposed a predistribution q-composite
key method that allows two sensor nodes to set the pairwise
key only when they share at least q public keys.
In an attempt to improve upon these two methods, Du
et al. [7] proposed a key management method applicable to
heterogeneous sensor networks. This approach uses a small
number of sensor nodes that have superior performance to
load more keys, increasing the probability of the shared keys.
Liu et al. [2] proposed the grid-based key predistribution
scheme and the random subset assignment scheme. These
methods can build the pairwise key between sensor nodes
in the wireless sensor networks. Liu and Ning proposed
a scheme [8] that has the great advantage of predicting
coordinates in the sensor nodes and then distributing
suitable keys in advance.
Li et al. [9] proposed a hexagonal grid key predistribution
scheme that uses a hexagonal coordinate system and binary
polynomial. Zhang et al. [10] proposed a method in which
sensor nodes insert their own coordinates and IDs into the
hash function and then generate pairwise keys to communi-
cate with each other. This enhances the relationship between
sensor nodes. However, this method lacks an authentication
scheme between adjacent sensor nodes.
The researches [11–13] proposed the location-aware
deployment model of keys predistribution scheme. This
approach divides the environment into several square areas
and randomly deploys the sensors in each area. The system
can be aware of location of the sensor nodes according to the
sensor node’s ID.
Liu et al. [14] proposed a group-based keys predistri-
bution scheme that divides the sensor nodes into groups
and scatters them. After deployment, the sensor nodes may
suﬀer from wind force or terrain condition, making it
likely that in-group sensor nodes likely become neighbors.
Finally, they modeled the deployment distribution as a
Gaussian distribution. Building pairwise keys between in-
group sensor nodes and cross-group sensor nodes oﬀers
several advantages. Hence, they built the pairwise key
between sensor nodes in the same group using the in-group
key predistribution method and used the cross-group key
predistribution method to build the pairwise key between
adjacent sensor nodes in the diﬀerent groups.
Moharrum and Eltoweissy [15] compared the merits
and faults of the dynamic key generation and static key
generation methods. Based on this analysis, they proposed a
new method called an exclusion basis system (EBS) based on
the dynamic key management scheme. Eltoweissy et al. [16]
proposed a localized combinatorial keying (LOCK) method
that generates the dynamic key based on the EBS.
Perrig et al. presented two security protocols [17] for
sensor networks, called SNEP and µTESLA hereafter. SNEP
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Figure 1: Message authentication code.
achieves data confidentiality and data authentication, while
µTESLA ensures data integrity. In these structures, each
sensor node shares the secret key with the base station. The
base station functions as a trusted third party to keep and
distribute the secret key. Younis et al. [18] and Jolly et al. [19]
proposed a scheme much like the dynamic key generation
model. The scheme can update and change the key through
the certification authority (CA).
Chan and Perrig [20] proposed a protocol called
peer intermediaries for key establishment (PIKE). In this
approach, sensor nodes are trusted third parties and manage
the key. Guorui et al. [21] proposed a group-based dynamic
keymanagement scheme. This system can update and change
the key independently of the base station or cluster head.
Cheng and Agrawal [22] proposed an eﬀective method to
build and manage the pairwise key. In the scheme, the system
generates a two-dimensional key matrix, and each sensor
node randomly stores one column and row of the key array
from the matrix before deployment. After the sensor nodes
are deployed, two adjacent sensor nodes can generate the
pairwise key of each other.
Kausar et al. [23] proposed a hierarchical sensor network
consisting of a small number of high-end sensors (H-
sensor node) and a large number of low-end sensors (L-
sensor node). The scheme is a scalable protocol for key
management in the sensor networks to address the sensor
nodes resource constraints, including computation, storage,
and communication.
3. Proposed Scheme
This paper proposes a key-chain protocol for key manage-
ment that is designed for heterogeneous sensor networks
(HSNs). Each cluster head generates its own key-chain,
which encrypts messages and communicates with the other
sensor nodes in the cluster. Based on hierarchical clustering,
each cluster consists of several sensor nodes and a cluster
head. Several clusters and a base station form the heteroge-
neous sensor networks.
There are two types of sensors in hierarchical clustering
HSNs: a small number of powerful high-end sensors (H-
sensors, the same as the cluster head) and a large number
of low-end sensors (L-sensors, the same as the ordinary
sensor node). The H-sensors are equipped with tamper-
resistant hardware and have more memory and greater
processing capability. They can communicate directly with
the base station. The L-sensors are normal sensor nodes
that are limited in terms of processing capability, power,
and memory. L-sensors acquire data from the surrounding
environment and forward the collected data to the H-
sensors. The H-sensors can communicate directly with the
base station; all the L-sensor packets are transmitted to the BS
via the H-sensor. This approach assumes that the base station
is trusted. Figure 2 shows the architecture of hierarchically
clustered HSNs.
3.1. System Setup. This section discusses the initialization
and authentication phases in HSNs, including setting up
the key-chain and setting up pairwise keys for the L-sensor
nodes.
The proposed system assumes the following five commu-
nication rules.
(1) H-sensors can directly communicate with the BS.
(2) The base station exchanges messages with L-sensors
through H-sensors and vice versa.
(3) H-sensors can send messages to specific L-sensors in
the cluster.
(4) H-sensors can broadcast messages to all L-sensors in
the cluster.
(5) L-sensors must exchange the messages with each
other through an H-sensor. In other words, L-sensors
cannot directly exchange messages with each other.
Hence, a compromised L-sensor cannot aﬀect the
other L-sensor in the cluster.















Figure 2: Architecture of hierarchical clustering HSNs.
These communication rules are usually assumed for the
hierarchical sensor networks such as SPINS [17], Gupta
and Younis [24], and LEACH [25]. In this paper, these
communication rules should be followed in order to avoid
a compromised node infringing the other L-sensors and to
prevent the attacks such as replay attacks or man-in-the-
middle attacks.
3.1.1. Initialization Phase. The base station generates a key
pool of size P before deployment of r L-sensors and q H-
sensors, where P  q. The base station then chooses a
unique key for each H-sensor, which is regarded as cluster
key HK.
Before the deployment, the BS uses HK and random
number RS to generate a subkey KS = H(HK ⊕ RS), and
then uses KS and R1 ∼ Rn to generate a key-chain for each
H-sensor as shown below:
Kn−1 = H(KS ⊕ Rn),
Kn−2 = H(Kn−1 ⊕ Rn−1),
...
K1 = H(K2 ⊕ R2),
K0 = H(K1 ⊕ R1).
(1)
Hence, each H-sensor will obtain distinct key-chains, KS,
and random numbers R1 ∼ Rn from the BS. H-sensor and L-
sensor are stored with the same hash function H(·) and KT ,
where KT is a temporary session key for all H-sensors and L-
sensors, and KT /=HK . All keys and parameters for each node
will be passed from BS to sensor nodes through an oﬄine
secure channel.
H-sensors and L-sensors are randomly distributed in
the environment. Each node is static and aware of its own
location. H-sensors and L-sensors can use the protocol in
[26] to evaluate the locations without GPS devices. Section 5
discusses the length n of the key-chain. To illustrate the
Table 1: The definition of the notations.
HK j The jth cluster key of H-sensor
LKi, j
The pairwise key between L-sensor i
and H-sensor j
HID j The unique ID for H-sensor j
LIDi The unique ID for L-sensor i
Kl
The lth key in the key-chain, where
1 ≤ l ≤ n
KT
A temporary session key for all
H-sensors and L-sensors
RNH
A random number generated by
H-sensor
{MAC(M) ||M}K The encryption of messageM withMAC using the key K




H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}160
⊕ XOR operator
|| A concatenation operator
system eﬀectively, this study considers a single cluster. Table 1
presents the notation related to sensor nodes.
3.1.2. Authentication Phase. After all nodes are distributed
in the environment, the H-sensors decide which nodes to
connect with. To explain the environment, this paper focuses
on describing the operations within one cluster.
(1) An H-sensor j broadcasts a hello message to all the
neighboring L-sensors using the maximum power, where the
hello message includes the H-sensor’s ID HID j . The location
of the H-sensor j and a random number RNH is encrypted
by KT . The format of hello message is as follows:
HID j || hello message || Location of the H-sensor ||
{RNH}KT .
(2)
(2) The L-sensor i may receive one or more hello
messages if no barricades are sheltering it. The L-sensor i
chooses an H-sensor as its cluster head according to the
distance and best signal strength of the message. In this
environment, each L-sensor notes other H-sensors from
which it receives the hello messages, and these H-sensors are
recorded as backup cluster heads in case the chief cluster
head is disabled. If the L-sensor i receives the message, it
then takes its own LIDi and RNH and generates a pairwise
key LKi, j = {H(RNH || LIDi)}KT , replying to the H-sensor.
The format of this response message is as follows:











Plain text can be used to deliver the HID j in the message.
Therefore, the receiver node can avoid decrypting the
message, saving time and power.
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BS ∥ request message {MAC(M) ∥M} KBS
HID j ∥ {MAC(M1 ∥M2 . . .) ∥M1 ∥M2 . . .}KBS






ocation of L-sensor ∥ {MAC(M ∥ C) | LIDi ∥M ∥ C}KiL
Figure 3: BS requires the data from the HSNs.
(3) After receiving the response message and LIDi of the
L-sensor i, the H-sensor j generates pairwise key LK∗i, j =
{H(RNH || LIDi)}KT . If the condition MAC(LK∗i, j) =
MAC(LKi, j) is satisfied, the H-sensor confirms the validity
of the L-sensor i; if not, H-sensor discards the response
message. Hence, the H-sensor j can use this pairwise key to
announce the message or new key Kl of the key-chain to the
L-sensor i in the cluster.
(4) Then, the H-sensor j transmits the group key K0 for
two members in the cluster using the appropriate pairwise
key, where K0 is the first key in the key-chain. All subsequent
messages transmitted within the cluster are encrypted by the
K0. The format of new key message is as follows:
HID j || Location of the L-sensor || {K0}LKi, j . (4)
(5) After determining all the clustering nodes, the H-
sensor j broadcasts the ID of members to all the nodes using
K0. If the H-sensor receives the response message from node
u and node v simultaneously, the H-sensor judges whether
node u and node v are neighbors based on the locations.
However, this method does not always produce accurate
results. If there is a barricade between node u and node
v, it does not have an eﬀect on the security. After judging
whether the L-sensors are adjacent, the H-sensor sends all the
L-sensor’s IDs to the nodes. The format of neighbor message
is as follows:
HID j || neighbor message ||
{





3.2. Normal Operations of HSNs. In the proposed system, the
BS generates a key-chain for broadcasting and encrypting
messages to the H-sensors. This process is very similar
to what the H-sensor does for the L-sensor, as described
in Sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.2. To simplify the description of
the system structure, this paper omits the details of these
procedures. This paper assumes that the BS has generated a
key-chain and used the key, say KBS, and pairwise key HK j
(the same as cluster key) for all the H-sensors.
This section discusses two diﬀerent scenarios for the
normal operations of the HSNs. Scenario 1 is that the BS
broadcasts a message to all the H-sensors to gather the data
from all the L-sensors. Scenario 2 is that the BS asks the H-
sensor j to request the data from the specific L-sensor i.
Scenario 1. Figure 3 shows that the BS broadcasts the
message using key-chain key KBS to all the H-sensors for
requesting to gather the data from the HSNs. The H-sensor
then uses the cluster key Ki to communicate with the L-
sensors.
Scenario 2. Figure 4 shows that the BS sends the demand
using pairwise key HKj to H-sensor j to request the data
from L-sensor i in the HSNs. H-sensor j uses the pairwise
key LKi, j to communicate with the L-sensor i.
3.3. Adaptability of the Proposed Method. This section dis-
cusses the adaptability of the proposed method, including
key revocation, addition of a new node, and the generation
of a new key-chain.
3.3.1. Key Revocation. In HSNs, if the BS discovers a
compromised node or adversary (assuming in this study that
the BS has an intrusion detection system mechanism inside),
the BS broadcasts the following message to all the H-sensors:
Malicious node message
|| {MAC(LIDx) || location of the node x ||
node’s LIDx}KBS .
(6)
Assuming that node u is a compromised node, H-sensor
j will transmit the revocation message to remove the ID of
node u from the other members in the cluster. H-sensor j
then uses the pairwise key to encrypt the new key for L-
sensor. This method ensures that the compromised node
does not receive the new key and the old key is revoked. The






of L-sensor ∥ {MAC(M ∥ C) | LIDi ∥M ∥ CocationL
BS ∥ request message {MAC(LIDi) ∥ LIDi} HKi
HID j ∥ {MAC(M) ∥ LIDi ∥M}HKi
HID j ∥ request message {MAC(M) ∥M} LKi, j
}LKi, j
Figure 4: BS requires the data from the specific L-sensor.
format of key revocation message that H-sensor sends to the
L-sensor x is as follows:
HID j || revocation message ||
{remove u’s ID form IDs list || Ki+1 || Ri+1}LKx, j .
(7)
The L-sensor x confirms the Ki using Ki+1 and Ri+1. If
Ki = H(Ki+1⊕Ri+1) is satisfied, they useKi+1 to sendmessages
to each other. Otherwise, L-sensor x discards the message.
3.3.2. Addition of a New Node. The newly deployed node
needs to establish pairwise key with its own H-sensor. Before
adding new node into an environment, this new node should
be ensured that it is not a comprised node and the hash
functionH(·) and the temporary session key K ′T are securely
stored. After the deployment of a new L-sensor x, the BS
actively delivers the following message about the addition of
a new node to all H-sensors:
new node message ||
{




In this scheme, L-sensor x is deployed randomly in the
environment. The L-sensor x will immediately broadcast a
request message to all the neighboring H-sensors, where
the message includes the L-sensor’s ID LIDx encrypted by
K ′T . If there are more than one H-sensor that received the
request message from node x, then H-sensors will reply with
a random number RN′H to the node x by using K
′
T with
maximum power. The L-sensor x chooses anH-sensor j as its
cluster head according to the distance and best signal strength
of the message that replies to it. Hence, the node x and H-
sensor j will generate the pairwise key LKx, j by using the
RN′H , LIDx, and K
′
T , as in Figure 5.
After generating the LKx, j , the H-sensor uses it to send
the Rm || Rm−1 . . . || R1 || Km || K0 in a message
to L-sensor x, where Rm and Km are the current random
number and key in the key chain used by the H-sensor,
respectively. The new L-sensor verifies if K0 = H(H(H(Km⊕
Rm) ⊕ Rm−1) · · · ⊕ R1) is satisfied. If yes, then L-sensor x
confirms the validity of the key K1 to Km and H-sensor
j. Otherwise, the L-sensor x discards its message, and will
select another H-sensor. Finally, L-sensor x then transmits
the message to the H-sensor using Km, and then H-sensor
j broadcasts the neighbor message to all the members once
again.
3.3.3. Generation of a New Key-Chain. When the last key KS
in the key-chain has been used in the cluster, as long as H-
sensor still has suﬃcient power, it creates a new key-chain for
the L-sensors in the cluster. H-sensor j uses the pairwise key
to encrypt the new key for the L-sensors. The format of the
message that the H-sensor sends to L-sensor x is as follows:
HID j || Location of the L-sensor || {MAC(K0) || K0}LKi, j .
(9)
4. Robustness to Attacks
A malicious node can be either an outside node that does
not know the Kl in the key-chain or pairwise keys or a node
that is captured by an adversary and becomes an internal
compromised node.
This section classifies all potential attacks into five
categories, such as guessing attacks, replay attacks, man-
in-the-middle attacks, node capture attacks, and denial of
service attack.
4.1. Guessing Attacks. Guessing attacks are a crucial concern
in any security-based system. Assume that an adversary
can obtain information or data related to the Ki in the
HSNs. Based on this public information, it may be able to
guess the Ki. However, the H-sensor will change the Ki to
Ki+1 at regular intervals. Further, each L-sensor node can
use the pairwise key to encrypt messages to the H-sensor.
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HID j ∥ request message {MAC(LIDx) ∥ LIDx} KT 
2
3
L-sensor x H-sensor j
1
4
HID j ∥ location of the L-sensor x ∥ {RNH } KT 
HID j ∥ location of the L-sensor x ∥ {Rm ∥ Rm−1 . . . ∥ R1 ∥ Km ∥ K0}LKx, j
The L-sensor node x and H-sensor j will
generate the pairwise key LKx, j
= {H( ∥ LIDx)} KT LKx, j RNH 
Figure 5: A pairwise key established between the node x and H-sensor j.
Therefore, the guessing attack does not have any eﬀect in this
environment.
4.2. Replay Attacks. The L-sensor i transmits the
following message to the H-sensor j : HID j ||
{MAC(M || C) || LIDi ||M || C}LKi, j . The message includes
H-sensor’s ID, plain text M, MAC, L-sensor’s ID, and a count
C. When L-sensor i delivers the message it increases the C
once. After the H-sensor j receives the message from the
L-sensor i, it checks the value of C to determine if the node
suﬀers from the replay attack.
4.3. Man-in-the-Middle Attacks. Man-in-the-middle attacks
are a type of eavesdropping in which the adversary makes
independent connections with the nodes and takes over
the handling of messages between an L-sensor and the H-
sensor. This attack fools sensors into thinking that they
are communicating directly with each other over a private
connection, when in fact all the details are controlled by the
adversary. Based on the rules of the communication between
nodes, the L-sensor and the H-sensor use a pairwise key or
group key to securely and directly transmit messages to each
other (as do the H-sensor and the base station). Therefore, if
an adversary does not have the pairwise key or group key, it
still cannot eavesdrop or modify the content of the message.
Therefore, the man-in-the-middle attack does not have any
eﬀect on HSNs.
4.4. Node Capture Attacks. It is diﬃcult to prevent this type
of attacks if nodes are not tamper-proof and the environment
is unattended. Hence, after all the L-sensors are deployed in
the environment, the attacker might acquire some material
of the KT and LKi, j from the L-sensor i using node capture
attack. However, theKT is used twice in authentication phase
and is discarded after the establishment of a pairwise key.
In our scheme, each L-sensor has a diﬀerent pairwise key
in the cluster. Therefore, based on the property of pairwise
keys, if the L-sensor i is captured by the adversary and it
can gain the interior material of L-sensor i, it still cannot
obtain the interior material of L-sensor x and cannot infect
others.
4.5. Denial-of-Service Attacks. Denial-of-service attacks are
common attacks in networks, where communication chan-
nel in HSNs is public. However, this type of attacks can be
detected by enabling the network with an intrusion detection
system. The proposed scheme provides protection against
this attack. This is because it uses a one-way hash function
and MAC in which the H-sensor sends message without
expecting any acknowledgement. If the adversary prevents
the message from reaching the nodes, neither the H-sensor
nor the L-sensor will know about it.
5. System Analysis
This paper analyzed the proposedmethod from the following
three issues: (1) the number of messages for grouping and
establishing the pairwise key; (2) the key sizes; (3) the
power consumption analysis. The H-sensors and L-sensors
are randomly deployed in 500-square-meter wireless sensor
8 EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking




















network. This HSN has two types of sensors: a few powerful
H-sensor nodes andmany L-sensor nodes. The ratio between
these two types of sensors is 1 : 10. In our experiments, there
are 25H-sensor nodes and 250 L-sensor nodes. TheH-sensor
nodes have a key-chain length of 50 keys. The L-sensors are
ordinary sensor nodes that are limited in terms of processing
capability, power, and memory. They acquire data from the
surrounding environment and forward it to the H-sensor
nodes. The H-sensor nodes then transmit the data to the base
station.
5.1. The Number of Messages between the H-Sensor and L-
Sensor. This section compares the proposed scheme with
other key distribution techniques. In the proposed scheme,
each H-sensor establishes a pairwise key with its own L-
sensor and three messages are exchanged: the H-sensor
broadcasts two messages, and an L-sensor node sends one-
response message. In updating the key, the H-sensor and
L-sensor nodes only send one message, where the H-
sensor node broadcasts the hello message, as Table 2 shows.
Although Kausar et al. [23] has approximate number of
messages that come to us in two phases, the proposed
method would consume less energy for L-sensors in large
HSNs.
5.2. The Key Sizes. This study compares the proposed scheme
with the other three methods, which are q-composite keys
[6], EPKEM [22], and the method of Kausar et al. [23].
These schemes have some properties similar to those of ours
such as storing keys in sensor nodes before deployment and
having pairwise keys. Cheng and Agrawal [22] and Kausar
et al. [23] also compared their methods with q-composite
keys [6] in their papers. Figure 6 shows a comparison chart
on the number of keys for the proposed method and others.
To maintain the probability of key connection, previous
approaches [6, 22, 23] need more nodes in the environment,
meaning that more keys are stored in the sensor nodes.
In the proposed scheme, regardless of the number of L-
sensor nodes, each L-sensor only stores three keys. This
approach reduces memory space requirements and increases
the eﬃciency of each sensor node.
In our environment, H-sensor node has an average of
14 + n keys, where 10 keys are pairwise keys of L-sensors,
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Figure 6: The comparisons of number of keys stored in the L-
sensor.
Table 3: The number of keys and functions stored in each member
of HSNs.
Base station H-sensor L-sensor
Keys P 64 3
Hash function 1 1 1
4 keys are HK, KS, KBS, and KT , and n keys are the length of
key-chain. Experimental results show that the length of key-
chain in each H-sensor is 50 keys. Therefore, each H-sensor
must store 64 keys in the HSNs. The L-sensor only stores 3
keys, which are Kl, KT , and LKi, j . Table 3 shows the number
of keys for each member.
5.3. Power Consumption Analysis. In this section, we will
run a simulation to show the power consumption of the
proposed scheme. The number of survival nodes as time
goes by is used as a metric for power consumption. For
each sensor node, the costs of the energy consumption
are primarily in data transmission and receiving. As in the
work of Zhang et al. [27], a mote of Crossbow MICA2DOT
with a Chipcon CC1000 radio device consumes 28.6 uJ and
59.2 uJ for receiving and transmitting one byte of packet,
respectively. ZigBee specifies a maximum packet length of
128 byte in which 100 byte for the payload, 20 byte for the
header, and 8 byte for preamble; the preamble consists of
source, destination, packet ID, and a control byte. In our
scheme, we assume that a packet consists of 16-byte MAC
(the size of hash, 128 bit), 16-byte payload, 20-byte header,
and 10-byte preamble. The total length of packet is 62 bytes.
Each L-sensor node is assigned an initial energy of 1 J, and the
power consumption for receiving and transmitting one byte
of packet is assumed to be 28.6 uJ and 59.2 uJ, respectively.
Figure 7 shows the number of survival nodes over time.
In the simulation, the proposed scheme is compared
with the normal HSN without key management rather
than the other key management schemes. This is due to
the lack of power consumption evaluation in other HSN
key management schemes. The power consumption of the
proposed scheme was evaluated in terms of the number of
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Figure 7: Number of survival nodes over rounds.
survival nodes over rounds. Each round in the simulation is
defined as the completion of one of the following three tasks:
(1) H-sensor requests and receives the data from all the L-
sensors in the cluster; (2) H-sensors requests and receives
the data from a specific L-sensor in the cluster; (3) key
revocation. For normal HSN without key management, only
the first two operations are possible, and the packet length of
46 bytes is also assumed.
The experimental results are shown in Figure 7. The first
sensor node that ran out of power occurred at the 428th
round in the proposed scheme in contrast to the 579th
round for the normal HSN without key management. The
whole network died at about the 557th round and the 786th
round for the proposed scheme and the normal HSNwithout
key management, respectively. As a result, the proposed
method incurred about 29% overhead due to the inclusion
of key management scheme. But considering the benefits
of the proposed scheme, which include protections against
the guessing attacks, replay attacks, and man-in-the-middle
attacks as discussed in Section 4, we think the overhead
is acceptable and the results could be a starting point for
evaluating power consumption on sensor networks with key
management.
6. Conclusion
This study proposes a new key management scheme that is
suitable for HSNs. By clustering all the sensor nodes in the
environment, cluster heads can generate their own key-chain.
The sensor nodes and their cluster heads can jointly establish
pairwise keys. Pairwise keys ensure transmission secrecy for
each message, protecting data integrity and determining if
the sensor nodes are malicious. The key-chain consists of
continuous keys, and each key is dependent. This makes it
possible for the sensor node to confirm the validity of each
key. Sensor nodes or cluster heads through the characteristic
of key-chain, when the cluster heads change the key, and
then sensor nodes can confirm the identity of the cluster
head and the validity of new key. In our scheme, the key
is calculated by hash function. The hash function makes it
possible to compress data into a fixed length and avoid data
collision. Sensor nodes only need to store a few keys and a
hash function at a time, reducing the memory requirements
of sensor nodes and ensuring key security.
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